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NOTES
“YOU MUST CONSTRUCT ADDITIONAL
PYLONS”: BUILDING A BETTER FRAMEWORK
FOR ESPORTS GOVERNANCE
Laura L. Chao*
The popularity of “esports,” also known as “electronic sports” or
competitive video gaming, has exploded in recent years and captured the
attention of cord-cutting millennials—often to the detriment of sports such as
basketball, football, baseball, and hockey. In the United States, the
commercial dominance of such traditional sports stems from decades of
regulatory support. Consequently, while esports regulation is likely to
emulate many aspects of traditional sports governance, the esports industry
is fraught with challenges that inhibit sophisticated ownership and capital
investment. Domestic regulation is complicated by underlying intellectual
property ownership and ancillary considerations such as fluctuations in a
video game’s popularity.
Since analogous reform is nigh impossible, nascent governance
organizations have been created to support the professionalization of esports
as a new entertainment form. As esports consumption continues to grow,
enterprising stakeholders are presented with the unique opportunity to create
regulatory bodies that will shape the esports industry. This Note analyzes
how the professional sports industry and foreign esports markets have
addressed governance challenges that arise from differences between
traditional sports and competitive video gaming. It concludes by exploring
two potential pathways for domestic esports governance.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 2016, the World Championship Semifinals for “League of
Legends,” the most popular competitive video game, took place over two
consecutive sold-out nights at Madison Square Garden in New York City.1
Tension in the stadium was palpable as ten young South Korean players, five
for each qualifying semifinal team, hunched over computer battle stations,
rapidly clicking away. Instead of watching the competition floor, spectators
looked up at the stadium ceiling where large screens projected various angles
of the live virtual gameplay. This is the future of professional competition,
sport, and video games—a potent combination of entertainment forms that is
ripe for potential investors.
Technological advancements have fundamentally penetrated and altered
the fabric of modern society by creating new avenues for media consumption,
cross-border communication, and social interaction.2 With the advent of the
1. See ROX v. SKT, LOL ESPORTS, http://www.lolesports.com/en_US/worlds/
world_championship_2016/matches/elimination/R2M1 [https://perma.cc/7A63-GS57] (last
visited Oct. 16, 2017).
2. See T.L. TAYLOR, RAISING THE STAKES: ESPORTS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF
COMPUTER GAMING 18 (2012) (attributing the increase in esports consumption to “important
structural factors” like favorable government policies, a competitive market structure, swift
development of information and communication technologies, the transnationalization and
globalization of the game industry, and individuals’ mentalities about accepting new
technologies).
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internet and increasingly speedier connections, online video game players
benefit from instantaneous interactions.3 Widespread connectivity has
enabled the rise in popularity of “esports,” a term often used to refer to online
competitive gaming.4
An esport is “a form of sport[] where the primary aspects of the sport are
facilitated by electronic systems; the input of players and teams as well as the
output of the [esport] system are mediated by human-computer interfaces.”5
In the esports ecosystem, professional video game players around the world
make a living by competing in tournaments and leagues for prize pools on
behalf of team owners and corporate sponsors.6
Esports games have captured the world’s attention, and an entire
ecosystem has developed around distributing competitive virtual gameplay.
If the 213 million global esports consumers formed a nation,7 it would be the
fifth-largest nation in the world.8 Game developers, tournament teams,
independent leagues, broadcasting companies, and other market participants
want to capture a portion of the growing worldwide esports market, which is
expected to exceed $1 billion by 2019.9 In 2016, the United States generated
an estimated $175 million in esports revenue from online advertising,
sponsorships, media rights, merchandise, and ticketing.10 In September
2016, seven North American esports teams announced the formation of the
Professional Esports Association (PEA), a “franchise-and-player-focused
league more in line with the structures of [traditional] sports leagues,”11
which emulates the early stages of traditional sports governance. Later that
same month, a National Basketball Association (NBA) team became the first
North American professional sports organization to acquire an esports team

3. ROLAND LI, GOOD LUCK HAVE FUN: THE RISE OF ESPORTS 1–3 (2016).
4. See Katherine E. Hollist, Note, Time to Be Grown-Ups About Video Gaming: The
Rising Esports Industry and the Need for Regulation, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 825 (2015).
5. Juho Hamari & Max Sjöblom, What Is Esports and Why Do People Watch It? 27
INTERNET RES. 211, 213–14 (2017).
6. See id. (stating that esports are “often coordinated by different leagues, ladders and
tournaments, and where players customarily belong to teams or other ‘sporting’ organizations
who are sponsored by various business organizations”); Michael McTee, Note, E-Sports:
More Than Just a Fad, OKLA. J.L. & TECH., Jan. 2014, at 1.
7. See Esports Market Report, SUPERDATA, https://www.superdataresearch.com/marketdata/esports-market-brief/ [https://perma.cc/YU2U-ZBJ7] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
8. See Ben Casselman, Resistance Is Futile: Esports Is Massive . . . and Growing, ESPN
(May 22, 2015), http://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/13059210/esports-massive-industrygrowing [https://perma.cc/N86X-ZAA7].
9. See Darren Rovell, 427 Million People Will Be Watching Esports by 2019, Reports
Newzoo, ESPN (May 11, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/article/15508214/427million-people-watching-esports-2019-reports-newzoo [https://perma.cc/HZ4X-DS3K].
10. MEC GLOB., SPOTLIGHT ON ESPORTS: AN EXPLORATION OF THE GROWING ESPORTS
LANDSCAPE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR MARKETERS 9 (2016), http://www.mecglobal.com/
assets/publications/2016-08/Spotlight-On-Esports.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCX3-CSY6].
11. B. David Zarley, The Sporting Singularity: How Traditional Sports and Esports Are
Dovetailing, VICE (Nov. 9, 2016), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/mgz7eb/the-sportingsingularity-how-traditional-sports-and-esports-are-dovetailing
[https://perma.cc/FXL987MD].
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and,12 in doing so, noted: “[t]he market created itself and became a product
that a quarter billion people are watching, and when they watch, they’re
watching an hour and half a day . . . . [I]t’s an incredibly large, immature
market that is somewhat of a Wild West.”13
Compared to more developed online gaming markets around the globe, the
American esports market is the new Wild West frontier.14 For the most part,
the dovetailing between esports and traditional sports,15 and the increasing
regulatory legitimacy of esports,16 indicates that many of these issues can be
addressed within the confines of traditional sports governance.17 Private
investment in esports continues to grow and “[t]hrough a series of purchases,
investments, and coalitions, traditional sport structures and proclivities
finally merged irrevocably with esports.”18
However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that, as the esports industry
evolves, esports will not perfectly align with the governance structures of

12. See Darren Rovell, 76ers Acquire Esports Teams Dignitas and Apex, ESPN (Sept. 26,
2016),
http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/17637299/76ers-acquire-esports-teamsdignitas-apex [https://perma.cc/KDN8-24N8].
13. See id.
14. On September 27, 2016, the coowner of the NBA’s Golden State Warriors announced
the acquisition of an iconic esports team, Team Liquid, and the creation of a new esports
ownership group. Rachel Young Gu, Team Liquid Sells Controlling Interest to Golden State
Warriors Co-Owner, ESPN (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/
_/id/17651274/team-liquid-sells-controlling-interest-golden-state-warriors-co-owner
[https://perma.cc/RH74-LEX8]; see also Axiomatic Acquires Controlling Interest in Team
Liquid, a Leading Professional Esports Franchise, BUS. WIRE (Sept. 27, 2016, 10:06 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160927006174/en/Axiomatic-AcquiresControlling-Interest-Team-Liquid-Leading [https://perma.cc/MH34-UAS6] (listing other
notable owners such as Magic Johnson and Monumental Sports & Entertainment, the owner
and operator of the NBA’s Washington Wizards and the National Hockey League’s
Washington Capitals); Press Release, Madison Square Garden Co., The Madison Square
Garden Company Acquires Controlling Stake in Counter Logic Gaming (July 31, 2017),
http://www.themadisonsquaregardencompany.com/news/2017/counter-logic-gaming.html
[https://perma.cc/R5Z8-MWRQ] (“‘As esports moves toward franchise league models similar
to the NBA and NHL, we intend to leverage our knowledge and insight into the business of
professional sports to play an active role in the development of this exciting industry,’ said
Jordan Solomon, Executive Vice President of [Madison Square Garden] Sports.”).
15. For the purposes of this Note, “traditional sports” refers to the “big four” American
professional sports: football, baseball, basketball, and hockey.
16. For example, in 2013, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services began to
recognize professional esports players as athletes by issuing P-1 visas to international players.
See Yannick Lejacq, Score! Professional Video Gamers Awarded Athletic Visas, NBC NEWS
(July 19, 2013, 7:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/technology/score-professional-videogamers-awarded-athletic-visas-6C10679998 [https://perma.cc/LR64-CFWJ].
17. Professional sports organizations also govern issues including players’ rights,
collective bargaining and labor union management, salary controls and transparency,
contractual stability, and antidoping. Although a comprehensive discussion of players’ rights
in esports is beyond the scope of this Note, there is a significant body of literature analyzing
these issues. See, e.g., Thiemo Bräutigam, Riot’s New LCS Player Contracts—A Legal
Analysis, ESPORTS OBSERVER (Nov. 20, 2015), http://esportsobserver.com/riots-new-lcsplayer-contracts-a-legal-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/Z97A-T3LR] (analyzing professional
player contracts in a developer-sponsored league).
18. Zarley, supra note 11.
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traditional sports.19 In esports, just as in other traditional sports, the
“business is [in] creating stars”20 that will capture the attention of viewers.21
Yet, if asked to imagine a “sport,” most would likely think of a physical sport
like basketball, football, baseball, or hockey. Despite many similarities, there
exists a tension between the physical world of professional sports and the
virtual world of professional gaming. With the recent global rise of esports,
the scope of what constitutes a “sport” has been widely debated.22 A
fundamental quandary for esports governance is that competitive play takes
place online, where physical analogues provide no precedent.23 Esports do
not benefit from the same level of legislative protection that has helped shape
the traditional sports industry,24 and, unlike traditional sports, game
developers hold intellectual property rights.25
Accordingly, this Note will address the need for either a domestic or
international regulatory body to support and facilitate the professionalization
of the U.S. esports industry. Part I provides a general overview of the market
structure and commercialization of both traditional sports and esports. Part
II focuses upon key areas where existing traditional sports do not provide
adequate guidance to esports, including ownership, territoriality, and media
distribution.26 Next, Part III assesses how regulatory bodies of larger esports
markets have addressed esports issues. In conclusion, Part IV advocates for
the adoption of a regulatory body that will facilitate the growth of the
domestic esports industry.27

19. See generally Dan L. Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional
Computer Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1535 (2013) (discussing the possibilities and
ramifications of ownership rights in esports).
20. Paresh Dave, Owners of Professional Video Game Teams in a Battle of Their Own,
L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tnesports-owners-20160526-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/7QF3-CKZW].
21. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 17 (“[T]ales are told about young men who have
ascended to the level of national hero by playing computer games. The stories circle around
the rise of a professional scene whose players have fan bases comparable to that of American
mainstream sports stars. They hold contracts and sponsorship deals, wear the latest in sport
gear from Nike and Adidas, and play in competitions that regularly draw thousands and are
broadcast on major television channels.”).
22. See McTee, supra note 6, at 7 (“A common argument made is ‘if it can be done while
drinking and smoking, then it is not a sport.’ Such a definition is problematic for defining
video games as a true form of ‘professional sport’ (as well as golf, track and field, and many
other highly athletic competitions sometimes regarded as sport).”).
23. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 37 (“Computer games can prove elusive artifacts when
we try to discuss the material world in relation to them because so much of our attention drifts
to the space on the screen. The media aspect of computer game play may prompt an argument
suggesting they cannot be easily aligned with a notion of sport.”).
24. See infra Part I.B.
25. See Andreas Rahmatian, Cyberspace and Intellectual Property Rights, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 72, 76 (Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell
Buchan eds., 2015) (“The international nature of cyberspace with separate (private, propertyholding) individuals and companies as actors within the cyberspace can potentially blur the
legal division between sovereignty and property. . . . So he who has quasi-proprietary power
over the cyberspace may very well acquire quasi-sovereignty over people . . . .”).
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part IV.
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I. THE UNITED STATES OF PLAY:
UNDERSTANDING THE BUSINESS OF COMPETITIVE SPORTS
In many regards, the governance and commercialization of the esports
industry noticeably emulates the traditional sports industry.28 This Part
provides an overview and background helpful for understanding the
emerging esports market. First, it looks at the joint-venture structure of
traditional sports organizations and compares this structure to the
organizations that have materialized in the esports industry. Then, for both
the traditional sports and esports markets in the United States, it analyzes
content distribution as a major force behind commercial viability.
A. Current Structural Models
The esports industry presents a “nascent structure that one team owner has
compared to the state of American baseball when the first vestigial forms of
the current team, league, and ownership structures were emerging.”29 A
primer on traditional sports governance, then, can offer insight into how
professional sports became a mainstay of the U.S. entertainment industry and
also provide a potential model for esports governance. This Part discusses
the governance structures of traditional sports and esports in the United
States.
1. Traditional Sports
Traditional team sports are generally structured as a league and consist of
clubs, teams, or franchises that are distinct, albeit economically
interdependent, business entities within the league.30 In the United States,
the highest level of professional competitions in team sports are known as
“major professional sports leagues” and include the NBA, Major League
Baseball (MLB), National Football League (NFL), and National Hockey
League (NHL).31 Each of these leagues enjoys significant control over
governance issues.32
Leagues are often structured as joint ventures.33 A joint venture is a
business undertaking by multiple stakeholders engaged in a single defined

28. See Zarley, supra note 11.
29. Burk, supra note 19, at 1540.
30. See generally Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient Joint
Ventures: Sports Leagues Should Look More Like McDonald’s and Less Like the United
Nations, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 222 (2006) (stating that a league is a “product created by
the combination of upstream competition organizing services and downstream clubs
participating in the competition”).
31. See Nathaniel Grow, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 573, 575 n.1 (2015).
32. See RICHARD PARRISH & SAMULI MIETTINEN, THE SPORTING EXCEPTION IN EUROPEAN
UNION LAW 21 (2008) (“These [governance issues] include reserve clauses, draft rules, roster
limits, salary caps, collective bargaining arrangements, revenue sharing, joint merchandising
and the collective sale and reinvestment of broadcasting rights.”).
33. See generally Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30 (discussing the joint-venture structure
of professional sports leagues).
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project.34 Each stakeholder shares equal control over the venture and also
shares both profits and losses.35 Joint ventures do not have immunity from
antitrust laws but may exhibit anticompetitive, cartel-like behavior.36 Within
a joint-venture league, teams and clubs are franchised to the league, and a
league-affiliated team cannot compete outside of the league.37
Professional sports leagues draft rules to coordinate the particulars of
competition, such as the rules of play, number of teams admitted to the
league, revenue distribution and sharing, player contracts and trading rules,
sale of broadcast rights, and stadium facility standards.38 When enforcement
of organizational rules is vested in an independent entity, such rules serve to
enable and preserve the integrity of competition.39 Each league typically is
headed by a commissioner who is empowered to enforce the league rules that
were collectively agreed upon by member franchises.40
Leagues are formed as joint ventures due to a “conscious decision to
vertically integrate,”41 and franchises collectively govern the competition—
like tournament organization—instead of granting such control to a separate
entity.42 Decisions made by a franchise-run league are subject to voting
requirements and are thus likely to be suboptimal; franchises are more likely
to advance individual interests over the interests of the league as a whole.43
In fact, franchises within a league “will necessarily make decisions . . . that
limit the extent of economic competition,” which may “simultaneously
enhance the overall quality of league play (acceptable under antitrust law)
and simply increase profits (unacceptable under antitrust law).”44
Moreover, major American professional sports leagues operate in a market
with few alternatives, and “[s]ports leagues that do not face competition from
close substitutes will artificially suppress the number of franchises in the
league.”45 New franchises enjoy permanent membership after authorization
by the league.46 They are also subject to entry fees, which are then distributed
among the league’s existing franchises.47 Individual franchises must
cooperate to maintain competitive balance and often swing toward

34. Joint Ventures, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
35. Id.
36. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
113 (1984) (stating that “joint ventures have no immunity from the antitrust laws”).
37. See PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 32, at 20–21.
38. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 222–23.
39. Id. at 222.
40. See PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 32, at 21.
41. Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 223.
42. Id.
43. See id. (“In any partnership where profits are shared, the marginal benefit to each
partner accruing through the sharing arrangement is smaller than the total benefit, and
therefore no partner has the incentive to vote in ways which maximize total payoffs.”).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 226 (arguing for restructuring and regulation of professional sports to better align
with consumer demand).
46. Franchises are not subjected to competitive merit-based promotion and relegation,
which could bump a team out of a league. See PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 32, at 18.
47. See id. at 20–21.
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monopolistic practices that run up against anticompetition law.48 Thus, a
significant risk of joint-venture operation without vigorous marketplace
rivalry is that the franchises, acting in their own self-interest, will prevent the
venture from providing innovative goods and services in response to
consumer demand.49
2. Esports
Compared to the traditional sports industry, the esports industry is
comprised of more stakeholders: the game developers, the league or
tournament organizational bodies, the teams that contract to play within the
organizational body, the professional players that contract to play on teams,
the sponsors, and, often, a streaming site as the content distributor.50 Both
tournaments and leagues form the backbone of the esports industry,51 and
each organizational body licenses the right to play titles created by game
developers.52 Esport competitions run the gamut of styles, but the most
popular games center around team-based play.53 High-profile tournaments
typically occur in front of a live audience, while other fans live stream the
games on social media and video platforms like Twitch.tv or Justin.tv.54
Instead of adopting the joint-venture structure of professional sports,55
game developers have taken up the mantle of privately sponsoring leagues.

48. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 223; see also PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra
note 32, at 20–21 (“[O]ff-the-field competition between teams operating within the same
league is moderated by a high degree of co-ordination in their activities. . . . Consequently,
throughout the US leagues a range of solidarity and restraint mechanisms are in place to ensure
balanced on-the-field competition.”).
49. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 215.
50. See Hunter Amadeus Bayliss, Note, Not Just a Game: The Employment Status and
Collective Bargaining Rights of Professional Esports Players, 22 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC.
JUST. 359, 363–64 (2016) (“Professional League of Legends play involves six main actors:
sponsors, Riot Games, the League of Legends Championship Series (LCS), the team
organizations, the professional players, and streaming sites.”).
51. Symposium, Sports, Media & Millennials: Evolving Landscape of Consumer
Demand, 24 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 143, 194 (2017) (“[Esport structuring],
organically, has followed two models. There’s the tournament model and then there’s the
league model, right? So there’s golf and tennis. There are no guaranteed salaries in golf and
tennis; the top ten players make most of the money. It’s all prize money and endorsement
deals. That’s very similar to what’s happening in a lot of [esports] games because they grew
up organically.”).
52. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 160. However, esports leagues and tournaments still
struggle to generate profits. See Hollist, supra note 4, at 828 (“Traditionally, the costs of
operating esports leagues have far out-paced profits, making it all but impossible for leagues
to launch.”); Pete Volk, Riot: Esports Still Isn’t Profitable, and We Don’t Care, RIFT HERALD
(Sept. 13, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.riftherald.com/2016/9/13/12865772/lol-esports-profitmoney-riot [https://perma.cc/5DV7-AXQK] (“One of the hottest issues around competitive
League of Legends is the profitability, or lack thereof, of Riot’s esports wing.”).
53. See Burk, supra note 19, at 1538 (“[Esports] tournaments employ a variety of
commercial game titles; tournament games span a range of formats and organizational
conventions, including both single and team play.”).
54. See id. at 1541.
55. See infra Part II.
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Yet, game developers “still see themselves first and foremost as a game
producer—not sports provider.”56
For example, Blizzard Entertainment and Riot Games, two game
developers based in the United States, have forged the path for the esports
industry by producing commercial games that have captured a global
audience.57 Some game developers, like Blizzard Entertainment, have
expressed a hands-off approach58 and do not want a primary role in the
development of future leagues or in shaping the esports industry.59 Other
game developers, such as Riot Games, however, have extended control over
the competition structure and governance of their games.
League of Legends, a game developed by Riot Games for the personal
computer, has arguably been the most popular esports title in the world in
recent years.60 The dominance of League of Legends can be attributed, at
least in part, to the fact that Riot Games assumes all of the costs of organizing
competition.61 League of Legends has its own developer-sponsored league
with seasons, brackets, an annual championship and all-star tournament, and
even a fantasy league for fans.62 Esports developers like Riot Games
frequently engage in political and symbolic work on behalf of the industry as

56. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 166.
57. See MARK J.P. WOLF & TORU IWATANI, VIDEO GAMES AROUND THE WORLD 605–06
(2015).
58. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 163 (“We’re not in the business of [esports]. You know,
we make games, we make video games. We see [esports] as an extension of our community
because this is a group of people in our community that not only enjoy playing our games
competitively, but also enjoy following these games and the players that play them
competitively.”).
59. See id. at 165 (“[W]e want [esports] to succeed, but again, it’s not our core business
so to become involved in that regard it’s almost like you’re talking about creating its own
organization, like a FIFA or something like that, to oversee the sport. . . . [I]t’s just a different
environment than traditional sports.”).
60. See NewZoo, Most Watched Games on Twitch, NEWZOO, https://newzoo.com/
insights/rankings/top-games-twitch/ [https://perma.cc/8PKN-NT3Y] (last visited Oct. 16,
2017). League of Legends is a type of video game known as a Multiplayer Online Battle
Arena (MOBA) game, which is a team-based game that operates like a combination of capture
the flag and chess. Hollist, supra note 4, at 826. Two teams of five select from a growing list
of avatars and attempt to control the playing field. See Champions, LEAGUE LEGENDS,
http://gameinfo.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/game-info/champions/ [https://perma.cc/53B53QZ5] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). Players must defeat computer-controlled minions as well
as opponent players in order to advance and eventually destroy the other team’s home base.
See Taylor Cocke, How to Play League of Legends, the Biggest Game in the World, KOTAKU
(Oct. 31, 2013), http://kotaku.com/how-to-get-into-league-of-legends-the-biggest-game-in1456272237 [https://perma.cc/3KY4-BFSL].
61. David Segal, Behind League of Legends, E-Sports’s Main Attraction, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/technology/riot-games-league-oflegends-main-attraction-esports.html [https://perma.cc/HK4X-CSCH] (“Though [esports]
were around for about a decade before Riot Games was born, no company has jumped in with
the same intensity. Riot controls every aspect of the professional league, right down to the
music composed for live events.”).
62. Afrasiab Mian, Can Activision-Blizzard (ATVI) Profit from Esports Leagues?,
NASDAQ (June 29, 2016), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/can-activision-blizzard-atvi-profitfrom-esports-leagues-cm642968 [https://perma.cc/3ZYK-CBHK].
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a whole,63 but some facets of esports writ large—such as proposing
professionalization standards and advocating for national legislation—lie
outside the purview and efforts of any single developer.
B. Making “Cents” of Sports Business Revenue
Though the fledgling esports industry is dovetailing with traditional
sports,64 it does not benefit from the same level of federal government
protection granted to traditional sports leagues. This Part gives background
on how traditional sports and esports leagues derive revenue.
1. Traditional Sports
The traditional sports industry is built around monetizing competition and
would not exist without collusion.65 Franchises within a league collude to
manage competition and maximize profits by enacting rules that govern
player contracts and trades, territorial rights, and content distribution.66 The
professional sports leagues “provide teams with sufficient individual
economic incentive to ensure that they will maximize the profits available in
their local market, thus increasing the entire league’s revenues.”67 In doing
so, they effectively operate as natural monopolies.68 Lawmakers have
enacted legislation that authorizes collusive television-rights bargaining
practices, and federal courts have issued league-favorable opinions.69

63. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 174–75 (“[Esports] companies regularly work hard to try
and legitimize (and indeed unstigmatize) computer game play, and the hard-core fandom you
see in esports.”).
64. See generally Jon Robinson, ‘League of Legends’ Mimics Regular Sports, ESPN (Jan.
30, 2013), http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/tech/post/_/id/3979/league-of-legends-mimicsregular-sports [https://perma.cc/F2R2-WKLV] (exploring Riot Games’s promotion of esports
as a viable real sport and occupation).
65. See generally Ryan M. Rodenberg & Justin M. Lovich, Reverse Collusion, 4 HARV. J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 191 (2013) (discussing how professional sports’ collective-bargaining
agreements tend toward collusive practices).
66. See Mohamed El-Hodiri & James Quirk, An Economic Model of a Professional Sports
League, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1302, 1304 (1971).
67. See Grow, supra note 31, at 588 (“[P]rofessional sports leagues have designed an
elaborate framework to balance their need to encourage teams to compete vigorously on the
playing field, while at the same time ensuring that a sufficient level of competitive balance
exists within the sport to create the most marketable and commercially successful product
possible.”).
68. See, e.g., Marc Edelman, Sports and the City: How to Curb Professional Sports
Teams’ Demands for Free Public Stadiums, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 48–49 (2008)
(“However, in practice, the four premier sports leagues rarely face competition from any new
league because sports markets have high barriers to entry.”); Grow, supra note 31, at 574
(stating that “direct government regulation of the [professional] industry is warranted” in such
cases).
69. See infra Part I.B.1.b.
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a. Pooled Broadcast Rights
Professional sports leagues have relied on television broadcasting as the
predominant means of revenue generation and content distribution.70 The
NBA, NHL, and MLB exclusively sell their national television rights on a
league-wide basis and, in some instances, permit individual franchises to
license broadcast rights regionally.71
The sale of broadcast rights, however, often involves transaction costs and
significant externalities because franchises “do not operate in completely
independent broadcast markets.”72 Broadcast revenue is contingent on the
league’s overall appeal, and competition can be distorted by the number of
consumers in local media markets.73 Thus, to ease the sale of broadcast rights
for traditional sports leagues, American lawmakers enacted the Sports
Broadcasting Act of 1961,74 which states:
The antitrust laws, as defined in [section one of the Sherman Act,] . . . shall
not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or
conducting the organized professional team sports of football, baseball,
basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs participating in
professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells or
otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league’s member
clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games . . . by such clubs.75

This statute provides an antitrust exemption to league teams when they enter
anticompetitive “pooled-rights contracts.”76 As a result, the Sports
Broadcasting Act allows traditional sports leagues to pool the broadcasting
rights of individual franchises and then sell those rights as a package to overthe-air networks.77

70. See, e.g., Grow, supra note 31, at 616; Michelle R. Hull, Note, Sports Leagues’ New
Social Media Policies: Enforcement Under Copyright Law and State Law, 34 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 457, 464 (2011) (reporting that the NFL earns over two-thirds of its revenue from
television, while the MLB and the NBA each receive over one-half of their income from
television deals).
71. See Grow, supra note 31, at 616. Even so, despite a trial court finding no evidence of
substantial injury to the value of outside broadcast rights, the NBA sought to prevent a
franchised team from broadcasting its games on a regional channel in a move to maintain
broadcast market power. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 229 (discussing the NBA’s
legal fight against the Chicago Bulls).
72. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 229.
73. See id. at 229–30.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. See U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1347 (2d Cir.
1988) (“Congress enacted the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, which exempted from the
antitrust laws pooled-rights agreements entered into by professional sports leagues.”).
77. This practice is known as “sponsored telecasting.” While this exemption only covers
over-the-air networks, the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice have
accepted that traditional sports leagues’ cable broadcast agreements with networks like ESPN
also do not warrant antitrust agency action. See Grow, supra note 31, at 620–21.
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b. Regional Monopolies
Furthermore, traditional sports leagues are built on local communities’
support for competitive regional teams.78 Franchises in a professional sports
league have exclusive territorial rights that cover major metropolitan areas,79
Despite such
thus eliminating the possibility of a local rival.80
anticompetitive practices, courts have ruled favorably for professional sports
leagues, and “[v]irtually nothing the leagues do can be considered per se
anticompetitive.”81
In 1982, a potential NFL franchisee, the Grizzlies, brought an antitrust suit
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the NFL and argued that the
collective refusal to accept the Grizzlies’ membership into the league
unlawfully impeded trade.82 The court ruled in favor of the NFL and held
that “a professional sport league’s refusal to accept for membership a
qualified applicant for a franchise in an area where no current league team is
located” does not violate antitrust laws.83
Such federal support of regional lockouts bolsters a professional sports
league’s profitability.84 Localities are willing to compete in recruitment and
retention of traditional sports players due to the reputational and economic
benefits associated with professional sports.85 Professional sports teams
have been able to obtain massive subsidies from their host communities and

78. Burk, supra note 19, at 1578 (“The culture, practice, and business of traditional sports
are built around the features of physical location; physical sports teams rely on the geographic
loyalty of spectators that identify with a locally branded team; locations for stadiums and
receipts from spectator attendance constitute important sources of revenue; construction of
such venues is typically dependent on tax and subsidy benefits from local communities.”).
79. See generally Rupert Cornwell, The U.S. Franchise System . . . Coming to a League
Near You?, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/newsand-comment/the-us-franchise-systemcoming-to-a-league-near-you-2374155.html
[https://perma.cc/H9JL-A2Z8].
80. See Edelman, supra note 68, at 49 (“[S]ome liken a sports league’s tight control on its
number of franchises to a form of blackmail or extortion.”).
81. Leah Farzin, On the Antitrust Exemption for Professional Sports in the United States
and Europe, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 75, 107 (2015) (“Automatic rule of reason
scrutiny for sports antitrust cases in the [United States] means leagues are always afforded the
opportunity to justify their anticompetitive actions based on the nature of their industry.”); see
also El-Hodiri & Quirk, supra note 66, at 1304 (stating that, with respect to collective
agreements such as “rules governing television and radio contracts” and “rules governing
territorial rights,” professional sports leagues have garnered legislative support).
82. Mid-S. Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d,
720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
83. Id. at 560.
84. See Edelman, supra note 68, at 50 (“Absent the monopoly power of America’s
professional sports leagues, few communities would likely subsidize the professional sports
industry.”).
85. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 913 (1999) (“Local governments are willing to invest substantial
sums to attract teams, as they are desperate to obtain the status of a ‘major league city.’”).
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local governments,86 typically in the form of new stadiums constructed at the
expense of the public.87
2. Esports
Video games are the products of a sophisticated development process that
combines elements of the creative industry—such as world building,
illustration, and interface design—with advanced software technology.88
Copyright law grants game developers intellectual property rights over the
creative aspects embodied within a game.89 The copyright holder enjoys the
exclusive right to make copies, distribute, make derivative works, and
publicly display the game.90 Thus, “[c]opyright is likely to be the lynchpin
in any dispute.”91
Esports industry participants—game developers as the “creators and
owners of copyright works,”92 players and teams, and content distributors—
all seek to direct revenue-generating activities. But, when key drivers of
esports revenue—such as “advertising, sponsorship, merchandise, live event
revenues, and potentially publisher partnerships”93—hinge on copyright
ownership, then the game developer as the copyright holder often directs how
a game makes money. While teams in traditional sports leagues share control
over a league’s actions,94 esports teams are subject to the control of the game
developer.95
Accordingly, sale of competition is often governed by the private game
developer through licensing agreements for tournaments and leagues.96
Licenses “can range from [competition organizers] having formal agreements
86. See Gregg Easterbrook, How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleecestaxpayers/309448/ [https://perma.cc/RS7B-Q7KH] (estimating that “[a]nnualized, NFL
stadium subsidies and tax favors add up to perhaps $1 billion”).
87. See Edelman, supra note 68, at 42 (“Since the 1970s, most local communities have
paid between seventy percent and eighty percent of new stadium building costs.”).
88. See generally WOLF & IWATANI, supra note 57, at 4 (explaining how video games
benefit from the verbal and visual literacy of the film and television industries).
89. See John M. Neclerio & Matthew C. Mousley, Copyright Law Implications in Video
Games and Virtual Worlds, in COMPUTER GAMES AND VIRTUAL WORLDS: A NEW FRONTIER IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 47, 47 (Ross A. Dannenberg et al. eds., 2010) (“Generally,
copyright in virtual world content initially vests in virtual world developers and creators.”).
Copyright protection for video game production and development is largely settled, but
property rights within video games remain a contentious issue. See id. at 62 (“Because U.S.
courts have not yet squarely addressed this issue, users and developers of virtual worlds will
have to wait for future judicial opinions to know with any certainty the extent of copyright
protection for their in-world creations and activity.”).
90. Id. at 49.
91. Burk, supra note 19, at 1569.
92. Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Evolution and Equilibrium: An Introduction, in THE
EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM OF COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1, 3 (Susy Frankel & Daniel
Gervais eds., 2014).
93. Jas Purewal & Isabel Davies, The Esports Explosion: Legal Challenges and
Opportunities, LANDSLIDE, Nov./Dec. 2016, at 24, 27.
94. See supra Part I.A.1.
95. See supra Part I.A.2.
96. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 159–60.
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with game companies to use their games in an ongoing tournament series
(and broadcast) all the way to ad hoc one-time agreements between an
organizer and game company.”97 Unlike in traditional sports, game
developers play a role in shaping the exposure and popularity of teams within
a league or tournament.98 Through license agreements, game developers
maximize profits by selectively authorizing players and content distributors
to exercise the developer’s exclusive rights under copyright in exchange for
royalties or fees.99 The general trend is for game developers to subcontract
out the work of organizing leagues and tournaments to regional affiliates,
thereby granting content-distribution rights for some form of financial
kickback.100
Furthermore, whereas traditional sports leagues derive a majority of their
income from collective television broadcast agreements,101 broadcast
television is not the primary source of revenue for esports.102 While esports
commercialization also depends on content distribution as a primary source
of revenue,103 the esports industry lacks the regulatory support afforded to
traditional sports in broadcast television.104
Esports matches are televised over broadcast, cable, or pay-per-view
channels, but most tournament audiences “attend” over internet platforms.105
Online platforms facilitate accessibility and extensive infiltration into any
market, which,106 in turn, empowers game developers to create new games
for player-versus-player competition.107 Instead of television, esports
consumers watch matches through video-streaming websites,108 such as

97. See id.
98. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
99. Cf. Neclerio & Mousley, supra note 89, at 82–83.
100. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 160.
101. See Hull, supra note 70, at 464.
102. See Purewal & Davies, supra note 93, at 27 (“In principle, broadcast revenues could
be a significant revenue driver (as in traditional sports), but historically there has been no
meaningful ‘traditional broadcast’ (i.e., to TV) of [esports] until this year, all broadcast to date
being effectively via digital platforms such as Twitch where it generally has been viewable for
free by default.”); Symposium, supra note 51, at 185 (“If you look at traditional sports, a lot
of these teams are going to be making roughly 70% or so of their revenues off of broadcasting
rights. But when you look at esports, actually, that number is closer to zero.”).
103. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
105. See Burk, supra note 19, at 1540–41.
106. For example, the extensive penetration of esports in South Korea is likely related to
South Korea’s eleven billion dollar network infrastructure overhaul—resulting in the fastest
internet connection on the planet. See LI, supra note 3, at 29.
107. See id. at 2 (“Many of the best games allow players to clearly differentiate themselves
through skill, falling somewhere between the curated, individualized experience of traditional
art and the competitive nature of sports.”).
108. Cf. Symposium, supra note 51, at 182–83 (“[W]hat’s happening in the whole media
industry now is unique in that there are cord-cutters; people are ditching their cable
subscriptions. And basically millennials and Gen Zs are cord nevers; they’re not even
watching television.”).
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Twitch.tv, where peak viewership can surpass primetime traffic of major
cable channels.109
II. DOVETAILING OR DIVERGING?:
COMPARING ESPORTS TO TRADITIONAL SPORTS
Due to the favorable legal treatment of traditional sports,110 the debate over
whether esports is a “sport” remains contentious.111 Certain aspects of
esports are analogous to traditional sports and the involvement of traditional
sports market participants in esports “may expedite the learning curve for
their digital brethren.”112 These similarities encourage a discussion
regarding which aspects of professional-sports governance are easily
incorporated into esports regulation.
Yet, comparison is only productive to the extent that esports parallels
traditional sports. Despite many similarities, esports reside in the digital
space, and such a difference renders analogous reform improbable.113 Part
II highlights the differences between esports and traditional sports such as:
(1) reliability of gameplay rules, (2) lack of regional ties, (3) preference for
online streaming over broadcast television, and (4) anticompetitive behavior.
A. Variable Rules of Gameplay
Video games are bits of user interaction “mediated by the software and
video apparatus of the game,”114 which complicates ownership of both game
109. See Michael Larkey, Note, Cooperative Play: Anticipating the Problem of Copyright
Infringement in the New Business of Live Video Game Webcasts, 13 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 52, 53 (2015) (“Peak viewership on Twitch can surpass primetime viewership of cable
channels like MTV, MSNBC, E!, and CNN.”); see also PAUL “REDEYE” CHALONER, TALKING
ESPORTS: A GUIDE TO BECOMING A WORLD-CLASS ESPORTS BROADCASTER 12 (2015)
(“Twitch may well be one of the top three biggest things to happen to esports in its short life
span.”); Symposium, supra note 51, at 190 (“One of the reasons that I feel that esports has
taken off so quickly and become this kind of giant, global audience is because the traditional
sports deals are locked into traditional television for many, many more years.”).
110. See John T. Holden et al., The Future Is Now: Esports Policy Considerations and
Potential Litigation, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 46, 48 (2017) (“The question of whether
esports are a sport is legally meaningful. The United States has a variety of statutes that are
only applicable to occurrences involving sport.”).
111. See, e.g., LI, supra note 3, at 4 (“Veterans of [esports] say it’s ultimately irrelevant if
competitive gaming is characterized as a sport. It has all the elements of competition: highstakes winnings, a barrier to competition that takes skill and training, the excitement of fans,
and now, the technological infrastructure to back it all up.”); TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 36
(“Well before computer games entered the scene, enthusiasts, regulatory bodies, and athletes
debated the merits of counting everything from equestrianism to snowboarding as a sport. . . .
It is in this context that computer gaming now finds itself sitting, often uneasily, between
digital play and sport.”).
112. Zarley, supra note 11.
113. But see id. (“There seems to be a conscious effort on the part of the analog sports
partners, not to fuck with the chemistry that has already proved so successful but rather to find
ways to work within and expand upon an already popular pastime. This is about augmenting,
not overhauling.”).
114. Burk, supra note 19, at 1553 (“Certainly the video game players can be observed
directly, but it is not clear that their physical activity maps onto the role played by physical
action in physical play; generally keyboard strokes and mouse movement are not what one
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and gameplay. Unlike traditional sports, esports’ video games are essentially
bits of code and computer software subject to various claims of copyright
ownership.115
Esports governance is complicated by the fact that game developers create
and hard code the rules of play into the game,116 and a game developer’s
interests and claims of ownership under copyright may be misaligned with
the interests of consumers, players, and team owners.117 Successful esports
games are susceptible to software updates that adjust and shape mechanics
that affect gameplay, which means that no dominant strategy stays on top for
too long.118 This collection of strategies and preferences that shape
competitive gameplay, the “metagame,” is constantly evolving and defined
by each individual game developer’s software updates.119
Esports tournaments and leagues may also impose a separate set of rules
or guidelines beyond what is embedded by developers into the actual
game.120 These additional rules are supplementary to the formalized rules of
play that are programmed into the game and often embody informal norms
of sportsmanship or fair play.121 Lastly, to add to the morass, “[t]he
popularity of [esports] games fluctuates over time, and there is no guarantee
the top games of today will remain in place in two, five, or [ten] years.”122
B. Lack of Regional Ties
Traditional sports teams typically obtain large subsidies from their host
communities and local governments,123 and leagues incentivize franchised

considers computer ‘gameplay.’ Neither is the unobserved alteration of voltages the players
prompt across various circuits a matter of much interest. Rather, it is the video output they
prompt from the machine that constitutes the activity of interest.”).
115. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. For a thoughtful discussion on
copyright ownership and claims of neighboring rights in esports, see Burk, supra note 19.
116. See, e.g., ERNEST ADAMS, FUNDAMENTALS OF GAME DESIGN 13 (2010) (“Unlike
conventional games, video games do not require written rules. The game still has rules, but
the machine implements and enforces them for the players. . . . It adjudicates victory and
defeat if those concepts are programmed into the game.”); TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 49
(“Computer games . . . encod[e] their logics in the very structure of the game’s software, and
perhaps in its hardware.”).
117. Cf. Frankel & Gervais, supra note 92, at 3 (“We often hear that copyright needs to
achieve a balance of interests. . . . [I]t is about balancing multiple competing interests from
multiple players and recognizing that equilibrium in copyright is complex and dynamic, not
static.”).
118. See LI, supra note 3, at 3.
119. See id.
120. See Burk, supra note 19, at 1563 (“[T]hese [additional rules] run the gamut from
specifications on hardware and equipment, to prohibitions on certain moves in the game, to
governance of ‘glitches’ or anomalies in the game software that players might otherwise
exploit during the course of the contest.”).
121. See id.
122. Purewal & Davies, supra note 93, at 26.
123. See Piraino, supra note 85, at 913 (“Local governments are willing to invest
substantial sums to attract teams, as they are desperate to obtain the status of a ‘major league
city.’”).
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teams to maximize profits in local markets.124 The league structure of
traditional sports capitalizes on this regionalism.125
In contrast, esports is a complex mix of regional and global participants.126
The esports industry is international in nature and “stable teams regularly
draw their players from a range of countries who generally do not have any
physical connection with a national home office but instead mediate their
engagement with the team online, at tournament venues, and in occasional
co-located boot camps.”127 Increasingly, large esports tournaments are
“distinctively international in orientation.”128
Moreover, unlike traditional sports, the U.S. esports industry is fractured
across many different organizations and competitive games and lacks a
governing body to set standards of professionalism and maintain rules of
play.129 Due to this lack of regional affinity, esports-tournaments,
organizations, and leagues have begun to license their brands,130 thus lending
name recognition while deferring to local organizers that are better equipped
with regional knowledge.131 Traditional sports governance fails to
accommodate and account for the “dual global-local status” of competitive
gaming.132
C. Online over Broadcast
If traditional sports leagues derive income from television-broadcast
agreements,133 then why do esports leagues veer away from the contract
model used by professional sports leagues?134 Due to relative antitrust
immunity, traditional sports teams have occupied national sports broadcast
rights,135 and new sports entertainment entrants face high barriers to entry.136

124. See supra notes 68–80 and accompanying text.
125. See Grow, supra note 31, at 588 (“[P]rofessional sports leagues have designed an
elaborate framework to balance their need to encourage teams to compete vigorously on the
playing field, while at the same time ensuring that a sufficient level of competitive balance
exists within the sport to create the most marketable and commercially successful product
possible.”).
126. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 179.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See MEC GLOB., supra note 10, at 9; see also Zarley, supra note 11 (“Perhaps the most
daunting barrier to entry for aspiring esports fans—and undue burden on the players—is the
sundry competitions, a dazzling array of ersatz contests and leagues going off, overlapping,
and winking out like fireworks displays, owned and operated by independent third-party
organizers lacking in the rigid structure imposed upon traditional sports.”).
130. Esports sponsorships have become increasingly intertwined with NBA investors with
regional knowledge. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also Jacob Wolf, Miami
Heat Invest in Esports with Misfits, ESPN (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.espn.com/esports/
story/_/id/18444193/miami-heat-invest-esports-misfits [https://perma.cc/X2QB-K7KR].
131. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 179–80.
132. Id. at 180.
133. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
134. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 144–45; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
135. See supra Part I.B.1.
136. See Grow, supra note 31, at 602 (“Thus, any new entrant in the professional sports
industry will likely find itself facing a catch-22, unable to generate substantial television
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By enacting the Sports Broadcasting Act and enabling pooled-rights
agreements,137 the federal government granted professional sports leagues
the ability to maintain competitive balance between interdependent teams
Collective
and helped traditional sports leagues remain viable.138
broadcasting agreements helped cement the commercial dominance of the
traditional sports business, but such agreements raise concerns over pricefixing and restriction of consumer choice.139
Instead, the majority of esports consumption occurs online via the
internet.140 Competitions have attracted the attention of several mainstream
media outlets, like ESPN and Yahoo!,141 that have launched dedicated online
portals and websites for esports news. An esports industry thought leader has
stated: “Traditional media is important to make [esports] more mainstream
and to expand the audience. But I think the old [esports] dream [of] ‘we need
to get [esports] on TV to succeed’ is dead. [Esports games] have a proven
record to be successful on internet stream[s] only.”142
Given the popularity of online streaming of esports, esports leagues often
do not prioritize television coverage and choose instead to focus on streaming
platforms like Twitch.tv.143 The sale of online-streaming rights can be quite
lucrative.144 For example, on December 16, 2016, an MLB- and Disneyowned video-streaming company, BAMTech, signed a deal with Riot Games
to “pay a minimum of $300 million through 2023.”145 In exchange,
revenue until it signs a sufficient pool of talent but lacking the financial means to sign elite
players without a significant television contract.”).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012); supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
139. See generally Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30.
140. See Symposium, supra note 51, at 197 (“You take a look at the NFL, and they’ve
grown as far as they can grow, so now they’re looking at London and now they’re looking at
Mexico and they want to go international. The NBA, the same way; Major League Baseball,
the same way. Well, again, almost like those are TV first, digital second, and esports is digital
first, TV second, or maybe even TV third, who knows—this is international first.”); see also
id. at 192 (“[Esports] breaks a lot of models, especially the broadcast model, and we have this
underlying IP ownership issue that’s different than football and basketball and baseball or any
stick-and-ball sport.”).
141. See, e.g., Paresh Dave, ESPN.com to Cover E-Sports with Same ‘Rigor’ as It Does the
Big Leagues, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fitn-espn-esports-20160113-story.html [https://perma.cc/8AKE-WCBJ]; Yahoo Launches New
Experience Dedicated to Esports, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 2, 2016, 12:00 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160301007090/en/Yahoo-Launches-NewExperience-Dedicated-Esports [https://perma.cc/JC4T-3BE9].
142. Radoslav “Nydra” Kolev, DreamHack Partners with MTG for Esports Studio in
Stockholm, GOSU GAMERS (Sept. 25, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.gosugamers.net/starcraft2/
news/25446-dreamhack-partners-with-mtg-for-esports-studio-in-stockholm
[https://perma.cc/2HVV-TAG7].
143. See Larkey, supra note 109, at 53.
144. See Todd Spangler, MLB-Disney’s BAMTech Inks ‘League of Legends’ $300 Million
Esports
Streaming
Pact,
VARIETY
(Dec.
16,
2016,
10:12
AM),
http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/bamtech-league-of-legends-mlb-disney-esports1201944167/ [https://perma.cc/Y7EC-PBE7].
145. Aaron Souppouris, MLB and Disney Pick Up ‘League of Legends’ Streaming Rights,
ENGADGET (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/12/16/bamtech-riot-gamesleague-of-legends-streaming-deal-wsj/ [https://perma.cc/LJ49-8KQB].
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BAMTech will receive the exclusive right to “stream and monetize” the
competition play of Riot Games’s League of Legends esports title.146
However, esports tournaments are structured so that the organizers retain the
majority of sponsorship and broadcast revenue,147 with some exceptions.148
This often results in imbalanced profit sharing between the league, the teams,
and the remaining esports market participants.149
D. Anticompetitive Practices
Traditional sports leagues are formed and maintained as joint ventures.150
Conversely, the most successful esports leagues are developer sponsored.151
Both joint-venture leagues and developer-sponsored leagues tend toward
monopolistic practices that could trigger antitrust scrutiny.152
A game developer that doubles as a league owner has complete control
over the players.153 For example, in 2013, Riot Games amended its contract
terms with a noncompete clause that prevented professional League of
Legends players from participating in other leagues and from streaming their
gameplay in any competing video games.154 With one amendment, Riot
Games unilaterally reduced the rights and earned income of professional
League of Legends players.155 Riot Games subsequently amended these
terms after the leaked restrictive contracts produced significant public
outcry.156
146. See id.
147. See Zarley, supra note 11.
148. See, e.g., Imad Khan, Riot Releases Details on NA LCS Franchising with $10M FlatFee Buy-In, ESPN (June 1, 2017), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/19511222/riotreleases-details-na-lcs-franchising-10m-flat-fee-buy-in
[https://perma.cc/XK45-M6X2]
(“Revenue sharing is another major part of the evolution of the [League of Legends league].
Last year, Riot started making moves with the media deals and digital goods surrounding
teams, and it is looking to build on that by requiring teams to ‘share a portion of their leaguedriven revenues as well (including things like sponsorships and merch sales).’”).
149. See Zarley, supra note 11.
150. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
152. See supra Parts I, II.D.
153. But cf. Zarley, supra note 11 (“The well-being of players may very well become baked
into esports structures from their earliest days, rather than needing to be shoehorned in
generations after the fact—and hopefully mitigating some of the potential downsides of
professionalization.”).
154. See Peter Bright, Riot Tells Pro League of Legends Players They Can’t Stream
Competing Games, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 2013, 7:13 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/
2013/12/riot-tells-pro-league-of-legends-players-they-cant-stream-competing-games/
[https://perma.cc/ZT3D-ZBJN]; see also Hollist, supra note 4, at 829.
155. See Hollist, supra note 4, at 829–30 (“In addition to their league salaries, prize
winnings, and sponsorships, many professional players make money by ‘livestreaming’ . . .
their video game matches in real-time over websites such as Twitch.tv. . . . With professional
player salaries estimated at around $25,000 annually, these streaming revenues amount to a
large percentage of the players’ incomes.” (footnotes omitted)).
156. Player Contracts and Unions in the LCS, DPG LAW (Dec. 2013),
http://www.dpgatlaw.com/Articles/Player-Contracts-and-Unions-in-the-LCS.shtml
[https://perma.cc/R6RC-4K5Z] (“[Riot’s director of esports] justified his company’s
requirements in part by saying that Riot wants League of Legends to be a legitimate sport with
a professional setting. Just as you wouldn’t see an NFL player promoting the Arena Football
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Furthermore, as both the league organizer and the game developer, Riot
Games can ban a player from participation in a league and even from the
game entirely.157 Esports players and teams may not have the right to appeal
these private developer-sponsored league rulings.158 In comparison,
traditional sports leagues—like the NBA—may ban or suspend a player from
playing in the league,159 but the player will not be barred from playing the
sport of basketball entirely.
Through copyright ownership, a game developer can also control the
expansion of a developer-sponsored league and prioritize developer interests
over public uses.160 For example, in July 2017, Riot Games revealed a new
franchising model for its developer-sponsored league in North America, but
it did not extend the same franchising model for European teams.161 In its
own best interest, Riot Games unilaterally restricted the rights of European
players but also affected the profitability of European teams.162 Unlike a
joint-venture league, which represents interests beyond the developer’s
own,163 a developer-sponsored league is focused on the exclusive promotion
of the developer’s game.164
III. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN GOVERNANCE GLOBALLY
In August 2017, the International Olympic Committee stated an interest in
including esports in the 2024 Paris Olympic program but did not commit to

League, he claims, you shouldn’t see a League player promoting [competitors’ games]
either.”).
157. Eddie Makuch, Pro League of Legends Player Banned for Anti-Semitism, GAMESPOT
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.gamespot.com/articles/pro-league-oflegends-player-banned-foranti-semitism/1100-6402913/ [https://perma.cc/L5GY-78RJ] (describing two lifetime bans
issued by Riot against professional players).
158. Richard Lewis, No Appeals Process for LCS Fines—TSM’s Reginald Must Pay, DAILY
DOT (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/esports/tsm-reginald-fine-riot-games/
[https://perma.cc/E63D-HDFH] (describing an instance where Riot fined a professional player
$2000 and denied any rights to appeal the fine).
159. Jeff Zillgitt & AJ Neuharth-Keusch, O.J. Mayo Dismissed and Disqualified from NBA
for
Violation
of
Drug
Policy,
USA
TODAY
(July
1,
2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2016/07/01/oj-mayo-dismissed-nba-antidrug/86603780/ [https://perma.cc/ET9N-C4J5] (describing the ban of a professional
basketball player from the NBA and subsequent reinstatement eligibility).
160. Frankel & Gervais, supra note 92, at 2.
161. See Khan, supra note 148.
162. See Xing Li, 4 EU LCS Teams Have Reportedly Applied to Join the NA LCS, DOT
ESPORTS (Aug. 1, 2017, 8:25 PM), https://dotesports.com/league-of-legends/eu-lcs-apply-nalcs-franchising-16330 [https://perma.cc/RSW7-H79M] (“The decision to franchise one region
before others dramatically impacts the balance of power, especially in terms of team and player
earnings. Teams accepted into the franchised North American league will be offered revenue
sharing for the first time, while EU LCS teams are left to wonder when they’ll achieve that
level of recognition.”); see also Leo Howell, LPL to Implement Franchising System, ESPN
(May 1, 2017), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/19287373/lpl-implement-franchisingsystem [https://perma.cc/JF3S-DWKK] (introducing a franchise model for League of Legends
in China).
163. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
164. See Hollist, supra note 4, at 829.

2017]

ESPORTS GOVERNANCE

757

doing so.165 The International Olympic Committee attributed its hesitancy
to the lack of an international governing body ensuring standardization and
legitimacy.166 Far from achieving even national legitimacy, esports-market
participants in the United States have thus far been allowed to self-govern.167
Other countries, however, have begun to recognize the need for oversight
and have taken affirmative steps to address regulatory gaps to varying
degrees of success. South Korea, for example, has developed an extensive
regulatory environment around esports.168 As recently as September 2016,
the French Senate legalized “video game competitions” and also
implemented regulations on exploitative entry fees, thus ensuring the
payment of cash prizes and minimum standards for professional player
contracts, visa issues,169 and even the rights of minors under the age of
sixteen.170 In June 2016, the Russia Ministry of Sport recognized esports as
a sporting discipline.171 This Part explores the successes and failures of
esports governance in South Korea and the United Kingdom.
A. South Korea
The current high-water mark for national regulation of the esports market
can be found in South Korea, where government infrastructure has been
developed to support the esports industry and where esport games have
achieved a degree of household recognition and normalcy.172 South Korea
highlights how cultural influences, larger infrastructure developments,
government policy decisions, and economic activities have intersected in a
165. See Marissa Payne, Paris Mulling Inclusion of Esports in 2024 Olympic Program,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
8,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/earlylead/wp/2017/08/08/paris-mulling-inclusion-of-esports-in-2024-olympic-program/
[https://perma.cc/UCH3-XKUC].
166. Id. (“We do not see an organization or a structure that will give us confidence, or
guarantee, that in this area the Olympic rules and values of sport are respected and in place,
and that the implementation of these rules are monitored and secured.”). To become an
Olympic event, a sport must demonstrate a certain level of international organization,
including having a world governing body like the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA) for soccer. See id.
167. See Symposium, supra note 51, at 188 (“In terms of the regulatory environment
generally, the video game industry has done an excellent job for thirty-plus years of being selfregulated and working directly with state, local, and federal governments around the world to
be able to maintain a level of sophistication.”); Josh Bray, Esports Is Getting Big, and Here’s
the
Scandals
to
Prove
It,
SUPER
NERDLAND
(Aug.
15,
2016),
https://supernerdland.com/article/esports-getting-big-heres-scandals-prove/
[https://perma.cc/3SWX-Y56N] (“[I]f the industry isn’t quick to regulate itself, then they are
begging for State and Federal authorities in the United States to come and regulate for them.”).
168. See infra Part III.A.
169. See Adrien Auxent, Esports Are Now Officially Legal in France, ESPORTS OBSERVER
(Sept. 30, 2016), http://esportsobserver.com/esports-are-now-officially-legal-in-france/
[https://perma.cc/EF44-U45T] (“Visa issues have become a significant problem for
professional players in France, as tourist visas are invalid and illegal for the practice of
professional esports.”).
170. Id.
171. See Samuel Lingle, Esports Is Now a Sport in Russia, DOT ESPORTS (June 9, 2016,
7:30 PM), https://dotesports.com/general/esports-is-a-sport-russia-3412 [https://perma.cc/
WUK2-CDVQ].
172. See Hyeryoung Ok, New Media Practices in Korea, 5 INT’L J. COMM. 320, 332 (2011).
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fortuitous way to support the formation of a flourishing domestic esports
industry.173
In 2000, the Korea eSports Association (“KeSPA”) was established as a
nongovernmental organization after approval and support from South
Korea’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and it has long been involved in
regulating national gaming and esports.174 The twelve-member board is
composed of executives from major corporations and the organization seeks
to promote “game culture” and support “game-related international
interaction business.”175 KeSPA, with the support of the South Korean
government, can officiate and organize tournaments,176 manage esports
venues and create dedicated esports stadiums,177 oversee the registration of
South Korean players,178 enforce professionalism and ethical standards,179
regulate sponsorships,180 distribute competition broadcast rights,181 and
coordinate licensing agreements.182
Due to copyright ownership complications, KeSPA has struggled to
enforce actions against game developers even with such a broad grant of
authority. For example, in 2007, KeSPA sold the television-broadcasting
rights for StarCraft, one of Blizzard Entertainment’s competitive games, to
two cable channels without Blizzard Entertainment’s express consent.183
KeSPA stated that “[i]f a game achieves success as an iconic [esports]
competition, and the developer pursues profits by declaring that their
copyright is valid in the [traditional sports] industry as well, then that is a
large obstacle for [esports’] growth and establishment as a future sportsentertainment industry.”184 Blizzard Entertainment demanded a higher fee
for its television broadcasting rights, which KeSPA refused.185 Blizzard
Entertainment took the case to South Korean courts, stating:

173. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 18 (noting that South Korea’s esports industry benefited
from a convergence of structural factors).
174. Id. at 161.
175. Mission Statement, KOREA ESPORTS ASS’N, http://www.e-sports.or.kr/page_
kespa2014.php?_module=kespa&_page=greeting [https://perma.cc/TN28-6RP2] (last visited
Oct. 16, 2017).
176. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 161.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 162.
179. See Brendan Sinclair, Twelve Arrested in E-Sports Match-Fixing Scandal—Report,
GAMESINDUSTRY.BIZ (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2015-10-19-12arrested-in-esports-match-fixing-scandal-report [https://perma.cc/F3B4-6RZD] (reporting
that KeSPA banned a coach and two players for life for illegal betting and fixing matches).
180. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 162.
181. See id.
182. See id. This list of KeSPA’s powers is not exhaustive. See id. at 168.
183. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 162. Blizzard Entertainment has stated: “If a player
competes, we expect them to get paid. And if someone signs a license with us, we expect
there to be some level of quality and we expect that those things are taken care of.” Id. at 164.
184. Id. at 167–68.
185. See Kim Tong-Hyung, Blizzard Vows to Take MBC to Court, KOREA TIMES (Dec. 2,
2010, 7:19 PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2010/12/133_%2077381.html
[https://perma.cc/L233-23XJ].

2017]

ESPORTS GOVERNANCE

759

StarCraft is not a public domain offering, as [Blizzard Entertainment] has
invested significant money and resources to create the StarCraft game and
the overall StarCraft universe . . . .
Classifying StarCraft and other [esports] as part of the public domain
deprives developers such as [Blizzard Entertainment] of their [intellectual
property] rights. There will be no incentive to do what [Blizzard
Entertainment] had done to balance the games for competition, which is a
more difficult task than creating a normal game.186

As a result, Blizzard Entertainment found another broadcast partner, GOM
TV.187 KeSPA retaliated by threatening to remove professional teams from
the KeSPA league if those teams appeared in GOM TV events.188 KeSPA
released a statement that Blizzard Entertainment has a right to a “rational
level of usage fee”189 and then asserted that KeSPA had the right to a
licensing fee for running the league and ownership rights over all
sponsorships, broadcasted programs, and program videos.190 Yet, despite
KeSPA’s objections, Blizzard Entertainment ended all negotiations with
KeSPA for any future partnerships in 2010.191 KeSPA maintains that it
provides value back to game developers through the authorization and
subsequent legitimization of esports titles—“a kind of KeSPA stamp of
approval.”192 KeSPA has extensive dominion over esports in South
Korea,193 but KeSPA lacked sufficient authority over Blizzard
Entertainment’s proprietary interests.
B. United Kingdom
Western countries lag behind Asian countries in esports regulation, but
current proposals in the United Kingdom highlight the European Union’s
approach to esports governance.194 For example, in February 2009, the
United Kingdom Esports Association (“UKeSA”) was founded as “the
[United Kingdom’s] official esports governing body” with the mission of
“working with government, industry, and community to develop, support,
186. Id.
187. Leigh Alexander, Blizzard Breaks Off KeSPA Talks, Will Seek New StarCraft Partner,
GAMASUTRA (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/119207/Blizzard_
Breaks_Off_KeSPA_Talks_Will_Seek_New_StarCraft_Partner.php [https://perma.cc/AC8JG5MN]; see also TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 166 (“[I]t’s not about [the money]. It’s more [about
how] we really just want acknowledgement of [Blizzard Entertainment’s] intellectual
property.”).
188. Alexander, supra note 187.
189. Id.
190. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 167.
191. Id. at 162 (“We’ve been negotiating with [KeSPA] about intellectual property rights
for the last three years, and we’ve made no progress at all. . . . We’re going to stop negotiating
with [KeSPA] and look for a new partner.”).
192. Id. at 168. KeSPA has stated that, in relation to developers, it “makes examinations
of games when the developers want to make them an ‘official [esports] title.’” Id. If approved,
then the developers are allowed to host “official leagues” within the country. See id.
193. See supra notes 174–82 and accompanying text.
194. See Rosie Duckworth, E-Sports—A Recent Explosion in Popularity but Still Room to
Grow, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.sports.legal/2016/09/esports-arecent-explosion-in-popularity-but-still-room-to-grow/ [https://perma.cc/A99A-N3FM].
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encourage, and promote the growth of a professional competitive esports
framework from an amateur grassroots level upwards.”195 UKeSA failed to
make promised prize payments and, in December 2009, it issued a final
notification stating that it had filed for bankruptcy.196
Following UKeSA’s collapse, the United Kingdom recognized the need
for independent governance with government support.197 Accordingly, the
British Esports Association (BEA) was founded on June 30, 2016, as an
independent governing body under the authority of the United Kingdom
government.198 In conjunction with the Department for Media, Culture, and
Sport, the BEA seeks to act as the national governing body for esports in the
United Kingdom with a focus on “grassroots” community organization.199
The BEA plans to “help and represent players at all levels; develop a
grassroots competitive video game scene that will nurture future talent;
support existing professionals and provide the infrastructure to create future
British global champions.”200 It has already taken measures by meeting with
the Department of Culture, Media, and Sport along with several leading game
publishers.201 The BEA’s successes will be measured by its undertakings in
2017 and beyond.
IV. CALL OF (GOVERNANCE) DUTY:
CONSIDERATIONS AND PROPOSALS
Despite the current dominance of Blizzard Entertainment and Riot Games,
the esports industry has evolved and developed well beyond the contribution
of any single company. The composition of professional esports is not a
result of individual initiatives but comes from a diverse mix of actions,

195. Goodeh, UKeSA Launches, ESPORTS HEAVEN (Oct. 31, 2008, 6:05 PM),
http://www.esportsheaven.com/news/view/47606/ukesa-launches [https://perma.cc/H88REG3U].
196. See Richard Lewis, UKeSA Files for Bankruptcy, ESPORTS HEAVEN (Dec. 23, 2009,
4:28 PM), http://www.esportsheaven.com/news/view/49681/ukesa-files-for-bankruptcy
[https://perma.cc/U7GV-4MJB].
197. See Callum Leslie, The UK Launches an Official Governing Body for Esports, DOT
ESPORTS (July 1, 2016, 11:52 AM), https://dotesports.com/general/british-esports-association3537 [https://perma.cc/8TJ4-RAX9]. Upon UKeSA’s failure in 2009, an esports commentator
remarked,
I still believe esports needs a governing body and in particular one in the [United
Kingdom], but it needs to be government driven or sponsored [and] must include
the community at large, not just those wanting to profit from esports. It will be a
long time before an organization of this nature can make a profit, but the advantages
of a combined, rule defining organization on standards in esports would help
tremendously.
Tom Souter, E-Sports in the UK, TP REV. (July 23, 2013), http://www.tpreview.co.uk/blog/
2013/07/23/esports-in-the-uk/ [https://perma.cc/47Z6-FRVT].
198. Formation of the British Esports Association, BRITISH ESPORTS ASS’N (June 30, 2016),
http://www.britishesports.org/press-releases.html [https://perma.cc/H4TL-BJWC].
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. About
the
British
Esports
Association,
BRITISH ESPORTS ASS’N,
http://www.britishesports.org/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/S3DX-RA2C] (last visited Oct.
16, 2017).
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policies, and practices from a range of stakeholders like other game
developers, tournament organizers, and broadcasters.202
As evidenced by South Korea and the United Kingdom, governments have
already begun to regulate the esports industry.203 Interested stakeholders—
from public policy officials down to individual players—seek to situate
esports into broader conversations about sportsmanship and competitive
play.204 This last Part proposes and considers two alternatives: (1) the
formation of a pan-esports governing body under federal authority and (2)
the induction into an existing international esports governance organization.
A. We All Need Some Regulatory Body to Lean on
As esports leagues and professional teams continue to form in the United
States, public regulators should consider forming a national pan-esports
governing body with sufficient federal authority to curb anticompetitive
behavior and propagate minimum industry standards to foster competition.205
1. Independence by Design
Since joint-venture and developer-sponsored leagues have historically
exhibited anticompetitive behavior, esports regulators must consider
governance that protects consumer demands and stymies anticompetitive
practices. Traditional sports joint-venture leagues do not adequately address
the interests of all stakeholders but,206 instead, tend toward collusive
practices such as creating geographic artificial scarcity.207 Without rigorous
market competition, joint ventures do not provide optimal assortment of
goods and services, to the detriment of consumer welfare.208 Further,
developer-sponsored leagues may seem like an efficient way to govern
gameplay of a single game, but they also cause problems. Whereas control
in a joint-venture model is spread equally across all franchises,209 teams and
players within a developer-sponsored league forfeit any control.210 With
developer-sponsored leagues taking such an active role in shaping esports
governance,211 the industry runs the risk of promoting developer interests
over the interests of other stakeholders.212
Independent governance may mitigate such problems. This pan-esports
governing body should avoid creating its own competitions and tournaments
to ensure independence.213 An independent governing body could determine

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.1.b.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part I.A.2.
See supra Parts II.D, III.A.
See supra notes 183–91 and accompanying text.
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minimum standards for consumers, players, teams, and leagues. Such an
entity would, ideally, be structured with an advisory board of multiple
stakeholders—such as government regulators representing consumer
welfare, players’ unions, and professional team owners—to oversee the
functions of joint-venture and developer-sponsored leagues and to facilitate
negotiations with esports game developers.
At the league level, an independent pan-esports governing body can also
put an end to the “dazzling array of ersatz contests and leagues going off,
overlapping, and winking out like fireworks displays.”214 By requiring
preapproval of any competition or league offering money prizes through an
audit ensuring adequate financing, the governing body can help prevent any
insolvencies. All professional joint-venture and developer-sponsored
leagues should be required to register as member-stakeholders and pay
membership fees based on year-over-year earnings. Contractual membership
agreements could then set forth more permanent benchmark rules of play.215
At the player level, the governing body, like KeSPA, should mandate
registration of all esports professional players and,216 additionally, mandate
the registration of any counterparties that wish to employ or contract with a
registered player. Failure to do so should be subject to review, penalty, or
fines. If all players and players’ unions are under the purview and protection
of a pan-esports governing body, then the governing body will have sufficient
market power to appeal on behalf of its constituents, any exploitative rulings
or egregious fines imposed by game developers.
Furthermore, an independent pan-esports governing entity could facilitate
the negotiation and sale of content-distribution agreements217 or even act as
a clearinghouse for revenue flows.218 Sales of content-distribution rights
often involve significant negative externalities and transaction costs219
because revenue is often contingent on the overall appeal of a game.220 A
governing body could propagate industry practice standards for balanced
profit sharing and prohibit long-term exclusive distribution agreements.221
2. Federal Support Is Necessary
UKeSA’s failures,222 in conjunction with the limited successes of
KeSPA,223 support the notion that federal support and regulatory intervention
is necessary to ensure the success of a national esports governing body.224

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
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220.
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224.

Zarley, supra note 11.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts I.B.2, II.C.
See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts I.B, II.D.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 172–83 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B; see also Souter, supra note 197.
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Without enforcement authority, a national pan-esports body lacks
legitimacy.225
KeSPA’s relative successes in regulating and supporting South Korea’s
domestic esports industry stems from government backing by South Korea’s
Ministry of Culture and Tourism.226 Even with this support, KeSPA lacked
sufficient regulatory power to deal with Blizzard Entertainment.227 Part of
that difficulty may be attributed to a lack of independence.228 KeSPA
threatened sanctions as a league organizer, and thus a counterparty—not as a
governing organization.229 However, without more significant government
involvement lending legitimacy, it is unlikely that an independent esports
governing body would gain enough market traction to impact the stakeholder
actions, compel membership, or enforce sanctions.230
One potential solution is direct legislation. By penning the Sports
Broadcasting Act antitrust exemption, the federal government granted a
natural monopoly to traditional sports leagues and allowed those leagues to
flourish and grow.231 The esports industry is unlikely to receive the same
treatment,232 but other forms of direct legislation may assist the development
of the esports market. For example, in 2016, the French Senate implemented
esports regulations that targeted exploitative fees, ensured prize payments,
created minimum standards for player contracts, addressed visa issues, and
established the rights of minors under the age of sixteen.233 The primary
disadvantage to such direct regulation is that, since the esports industry is
essentially based online, changes occur quickly.234 The legislative process is
not anticipatory but often reactionary and likely will not be nimble or flexible
enough to adapt to new changes and trends in technology and the esports
market.235 Regardless, the federal government should be prepared to enact
legislation that promotes basic gaming rights and ethics—like protection for
minors and player employees—and also supports the legitimacy of a
domestic esports association.
Another option is to nest an esports association within a federal agency.
For example, a domestic esports regulatory authority could be a selfgoverning entity under the authority of a federal agency like the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).236 Since an esports organization often

225. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 174–74 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 179–91 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Part IV.A.1.
229. See supra notes 188–93 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part II.
231. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part II.
233. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
234. See supra Part II.A, II.C.
235. See supra notes 2–13 and accompanying text.
236. The FCC, the United States agency tasked with oversight of interstate
communications, could also step in to directly regulate esports content distributors like
Twitch.tv, YouTube, and others. See What We Do, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/whatwe-do [https://perma.cc/CS3E-VJYC] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
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engages in political and business dealings,237 an effective regulatory entity
should also be granted enforcement and dispute resolution authority. KeSPA
insists that its authorization of an esports game is imperative to a game’s
success in South Korea.238 Despite this argument, Blizzard Entertainment,
as a private game developer, can choose not to work with KeSPA and
contract with other companies without KeSPA’s intervention.239 Without
enforcement authority beyond mere reputational harm, an esports
organization will have difficulty promulgating rules and standards that all
stakeholders are willing to heed. At a minimum, regulators should grant an
agency like the FCC the authority and power to enforce actions on behalf of
the esports associations.
The manifold soft benefits of an independent private-public governance
organization are hard to quantify. A domestic pan-esports body would be
authorized to do the following: (1) provide an avenue for the community at
large to combat coercive practices imposed by dominant profit-seeking
stakeholders, (2) lend stability and reliability to the esports industry, thereby
attracting capital investment, (3) amplify the concerns of downstream
consumers and individual player interests, and (4) represent the aligned
interests of the community at large in legitimizing esports as professional
sports entertainment. Governmental support can only contribute further
legitimacy to these aims while also buttressing the growth of the esports
industry.
B. Join an International Esports Association
Should the federal government fail to provide adequate authority to a
domestic pan-esports organization, the body could petition for membership
in an international esports organization. Instead of regulating via
multistakeholder standards-setting procedures and domestic market power, a
domestic esports organization could largely defer to the regulations and
sanctions of an international organization like the International e-Sports
Federation (“IeSF”),240 a South Korea-based global organization, or the
World Esports Association (“WESA”).241 By joining an international esports
association, the federal government may receive international pressure to
grant a domestic governing body much-needed regulatory and enforcement
authority.
237. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
240. Member Nations, INT’L E-SPORTS FED’N, http://www.ie-sf.org/about/#membernations [https://perma.cc/S76T-N64F] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017); see also TAYLOR, supra
note 2, at 174 (“International e-Sports Federation was launched in 2008, positioning itself as
a coordinating organization between member nations (including KeSPA and a number of other
organizations in Asia and Europe). One of its main goals is the standardization of esports.”).
241. WESA is “the result of joint efforts between industry-leading professional esports
teams and ESL, the world’s largest esports company.” WESA, http://www.wesa.gg/
[https://perma.cc/EE75-VC7B] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) (noting that WESA is open and
inclusive and seeks to professionalize esports by “introducing elements of player
representation, standardized regulations, and revenue shares for teams”).
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Joining an international organization has significant advantages, such as
increased uniformity, sporting ethics, and standardization across all
constituent countries. Uniformity will allow esports stakeholders to access
international markets more readily. Conversely, by deferring to international
standards, the United States sacrifices the opportunity to be a norm-maker in
a rapidly growing global industry. By joining an international esports
association, the United States also compromises its ability to protect the
interests of its own domestic stakeholders, like game developers and
independent league creators.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, the “Wild West” esports market is on the precipice of
becoming mainstream, with large volumes of revenue soon to follow. As
investment into the nascent American esports industry continues to grow, so
too does the need to address regulatory deficiencies that plague the industry
on every level—from the largest game developer down to the individual
consumer. However, the esports industry cannot simply copy the
infrastructure and ecosystem that has been built around traditional sports as
an entertainment form. Conventional and existing sports-business structures,
like joint-venture and developer-sponsored leagues, have the tendency to
skew toward favoring the most dominant stakeholder’s interests at the
expense of consumer welfare. Moreover, esports games are subject to more
complicated intellectual property and antitrust issues.
Since esports cannot adopt the exact structures of its physical analogues,
an independent domestic esports governing entity must be formed to
accommodate rapid growth and create new legal rights or obligations.
Ideally, an esports organization would have the power to set, promote, and
enforce regulations on domestic participants across all esports. While
oversight is necessary for the esports industry to continue to flourish, such
oversight must also avoid overreach. With cautious steering, the United
States could help chart the future for the esports enterprise.

